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 Since the European Council established that Croatia met the con-
ditions for becoming a potential candidate for EU membership in 
June 2000, the integration process directed towards candidature and 
full EU membership was the fundamental Croatian “national strat-
egy” and foreign policy objective. In the period from 2000 to 2007 
the process developed with “varying velocity” and varying levels of 
success. Our research objective is to identify and describe the strate-
gic activity of the main external and internal collective actors in-
volved in the process (the Croatian governments and the EU). Fur-
thermore, we aim to evaluate the accomplished integrative results of 
their interaction in the observed eight-year period. Our analysis is 
based on the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism 
and the game theory model. The result of the analysis shows that Dr 
Ivo Sanader’s one-party government (2003-2007) was more success-
ful than Ivica Račan’s coalition government (2000-2003) in manag-
ing the integration process aimed at the accession of Croatia to the 
European Union. The impact and quality of EU support to the process 
was ambivalent, quite in accordance with the European Union’s am-
biguous and complex structure and policy. 
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1. Introduction: research objective and approach 
 The relationship between the European Union1 and the Republic of Croa-
tia begins on January 15th, 1992, with the international recognition of the 
Republic of Croatia as an independent and sovereign state. Similar to other 
post-communist countries of Central and East Europe, Croatia made the 
“return to Europe” the long-term strategic objective of its state policy. Dur-
ing the period of war and aggression against Croatia (1991-1995) and after 
1997, when the European Union adopted the so-called “regional policy ap-
proach”, the relations between Croatia and the EU were stagnant. After the 
outbreak of the “Kosovo crisis” in June 1999, the European Council ac-
cepted and launched the Stability and Association Pact – a project adapted 
for the countries of South-East Europe2. The Pact’s objective has been to fa-
cilitate and support these countries’ accession to the EU, and to foster re-
gional cooperation among them. The Pact contains the main EU strategy of 
enlargement to the Southeast Europe.  
 After the 2000 parliamentary elections, HDZ3, which had ruled uninter-
ruptedly from 1991, became oppositional, while the opposition led by the 
electoral coalition SDP-HSLS4 came into power and formed a new six-mem-
ber left-centre coalition government with Ivica Račan (SDP) as Prime Min-
ister. The new government brought new dynamism into the Croatia-EU rela-
tions.  
 At the session held in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, the European 
Council decided that all five countries of South-East Europe met the re-
quirements for potential candidates. This marked the beginning of an intensi-
fied political dialogue between the EU and Croatia. It was also the start of a 
process of change and adjustment of Croatian policies, institutions and ac-
tors’ behaviour in accordance with European requirements and conditions. 
 
1 In this essay, the general term European Union (EU) refers to the integration as a whole, 
i.e. both to single policies with legal personality under the first pillar (European Community) 
and to common and coordinated policies under the second (Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy) and third pillars (Collaboration in Justice and Home Affairs). 
2 Namely, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Monte-
negro. 
3 HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union) was established in 
1989 under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman. In the first democratic and multi-party elections 
(1990), and in the 1992 and 1995 parliamentary elections HDZ won the majority in Parliament 
and set up a single-party government. 
4 SDP (Socijaldemokratska partija – Social Democratic Party) is a reformed communist 
party led by Ivica Račan until he died in 2007. Now its president is Zoran Milanović. HSLS 
(Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka – Croatian Social Liberal Party) is a liberal party that was 
led by Dražen Budiša who was a student dissident leader and served time in prison in 1971 (af-
ter the “Croatian Spring”). Now its president is Đurđa Adlešić. 
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During the last eight years, Croatia’s strategic objective has been to acquire 
as soon as possible the candidate status, to enter into accession-related nego-
tiations, and subsequently to become a full member of the EU and NATO. 
This objective has been realized with different levels of success. 
 The public opinion and other interpretations largely differ in the way 
they evaluate the contributions of individual external and internal (collec-
tive) actors to the success of the integration process. It seems that evalua-
tions often depend on previously chosen pro-European or Euro-sceptic atti-
tudes of the appraisers and on their currently ruling or oppositional position, 
rather than on a theory-based and empirically affirmed facts derived from a 
complex analysis of the integration process. As opposed to that, our research 
is empirical and analytical, and we intend to evaluate the process on such a 
basis. We are interested in the interaction between the principal institutions 
and actors involved. Our attention is devoted to two principal actors: the 
government of Croatia – as an internal actor, and the European Union 
(Commission) – as an external actor, as well as to the political and institu-
tional context of their action and interaction. This necessary analytical re-
duction of the number of actors, which is accomplished by “raising the level 
of abstraction” (Lindenberg 1991), enables a better evaluation of the contri-
bution of individual institutions and actors to the success (or lack of it) in 
achieving the ultimate common strategic objective – accession to the EU.  
 Our research follows the neoinstitutional approach, drawing upon actor-
centred institutionalism and an analytical game theory model. 
 In view of the subject described above, the research objective and 
assignment of this paper is the following: 
1. to identify and describe the strategic activity of the principal internal and 
external actors, and; 
2. to evaluate and explain the achieved result of interaction between the 
principal actors (the Croatian government and the EU, (i.e. the European 
Commission), and their respective contributions during the observed pe-
riod. 
 
2. Theoretical guidelines and analytical framework 
 The questions asked and the sought answers necessitate a more precise il-
lustration of the chosen theoretical guidelines – namely, the actor-centred in-
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2.1. Actor-centred institutionalism 
 The actor-centred institutionalism approach has been theoretically de-
fined in the work of Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz5. This approach fo-
cuses on the influence of institutions on individual and collective actors, and 
on their preferences, views and abilities in various forms of interaction. It 
provides explanation for past political decisions, but it also enables a sys-
temic insight which can be helpful in a practical search for adequate institu-
tions that support the formulation and implementation of policies aiming at 
the common good (Scharpf, 2000: 65). The actor-centred institutional ap-
proach can be represented in a diagram (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Actor-centred institutionalism model 
I N S T I T U T I O N A L     C O N T E X T  
 
Problem  Actors  Relations between actors  Forms of interaction  Political decisions 
 
P O L I T I C A L     E N V I R O N M E N T  
Source: (Scharpf, 2000: 85) 
 
 2.1.1. Actors 
 The actor-centred approach starts from the assumption that social and po-
litical phenomena, which result from an intentional activity of individual, 
collective and corporate actors6, can and must be explained only through that 
activity. The Actors are characterized by certain abilities, views and prefer-
ences. 
 Abilities are very important in explaining behaviour and are associated to 
personal, material, technological, information-related, institutional and other 
operational resources. 
 
5 The approach is developing since the 1970s in the work of both authors from the Max 
Planck Institute in Köln. 
6 Collective actors are characterised by the fact that their preferences, objectives and opera-
tional control depend upon the members, while corporative actors have a high degree of auton-
omy with regard to its memebers (Scharpf, 2000). 
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 Preferences and views (perceptions) of the actors can be characterized as 
action orientations, and they can either be stable or changed through learn-
ing and argumentation. 
 Politics refers to the intentional activity of individual and complex (col-
lective and corporative) actors with the aim of realising a particular interest. 
 Collective actors vary with regard to their operational resources (abili-
ties), which can be individual or common, and with regard to their action 
orientations (preferences and views), which can also be individual or com-
mon. 
 If one combines the two possibilities (individual or common resources; 
individual or common action orientation), one gets four typological models 
of collective actors: coalitions, movements, clubs and alliances (Scharpf, 
2000: 102). 
 For the purpose of this paper it is particularly important to point out the 
features of coalitions and alliances, since, in the observed period, the inter-
nal actor in the integration process (the Croatian government) had the char-
acteristics of a coalition, while the external actor (European Union) had the 
typological characteristic of an alliance. 
 Coalitions are relatively continuous engagements among actors who, in 
the context of jointly arranged policies, pursue individual objectives and ap-
ply individual resources in a context of coordinated strategy. Therefore, coa-
litions behave according to agreement and agreed strategies, which all mem-
bers find useful. Although coalitions are regarded as single actors, the im-
plementation of a coalition’s strategy often depends on its individual mem-
bers7. 
 Alliances (unions) are based on common resources and common action 
orientations. They are “agents”, and they serve the interests of their “princi-
pals” – the alliance members. (Scharpf, 2000: 104). Regardless of the fact 
that activity resources are in the hands of the members, actual control of the 
spending of those resources are in the hands of the alliance’s leadership (in 
this case the EU Council). 
 Beside collective actors, there are corporate actors as typical “top-down” 
organisations controlled by a hierarchical leadership. They have an identity, 
define objectives and dispose of abilities that are independent of the interests 
and preferences of the group (members) which they should serve. Members 
 
7 The Croatian governmental coalitions are primarily coalitions formed in order to hold the 
post-electoral majority in Parliament and be able to put together a government. For this reason, 
in spite of much internal heterogeneity, they have managed to maintain power. Both coalition-
based governments had to deal with parties stepping out (HSLS and DC, respectively), but the 
governments still remained “stable” throughout their mandate. 
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do not influence the choice of options and strategies of the collective actor 
(leadership); they only have the power of recall (choice).  
 Corporate actors have the advantage of a high level of efficiency and 
highly successful leadership. This could not be achieved if preferences of all 
members were taken in consideration. On the negative side, there is an in-
creasing aspiration and need of actors who are not accountable to anyone to 
gain control over the processes. 
 
 2.1.2. Ability of actors to act strategically 
 Strategic activity refers to a situation in which an actor reacts to opportu-
nities and risks that appear in any constellation of actors. The reaction is 
based on observed facts and sufficient information, and on expected maxi-
mization of total benefit (Scharpf, 2000: 107). If the actors operate in condi-
tions of incomplete or asymmetrical information, the benefit can be maxi-
mized only through a significant increase of their capacity to process the in-
formation, which can hardly be expected from any real actor. When evalu-
ating the strategic activity of collective actors, which is a really important 
aspect of research, one should take in consideration their cognitive and 
evaluative dimension. The cognitive dimension points to the focus of collec-
tive actors on interpersonal processing of information and on communica-
tion. The evaluative dimension presupposes the ability of preference inte-
gration8. 
 So, the ability to act strategically depends on convergence or divergence 
of preferences between members of a collective actor and on the ability to 
solve conflicts within a collective unit. If we start from this assigned conflict 
level, the strategic activity of complex actors also depends on the institu-
tional context, which either facilitates or makes more difficult the solving of 
problems within a collective actor. For example, actors who have to rely on 
negotiations when solving conflicts are less efficacious than those who have 
other interaction patterns at their disposal (one-sidedness, hierarchical lead-
ership etc.) According to the theory of rational choice, it would be right to 
conclude that only an individual rational action is possible in pursuit of an 
aim. At present, however, there are many types of collective actors in the 
field of empirical research. 
 
8 Preference integration has an inter-temporal, an inter-sectoral and an interpersonal dimen-
sion. The first dimension refers to the ability to give up an instantly attainable priority for the 
benefit of a later bigger profit. The second means to replace one interest with another that is 
more important. The third means to sacrifice the interest of single members for the advantage of 
the whole community (Scharpf, 2000: 108). 
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This apparent discrepancy is overcome by the fact that individual actors op-
erate not only for themselves, but on behalf of larger units which many 
identify themselves with – families, groups, nations, political parties, minis-
tries, states etc. In that sense, it is fully warranted to use a state or one of its 
organisations (government) as a collective actor; provided that it represents 
the action orientation of other actors (Scharpf, 2000: 112). 
 
 2.1.3. Relation (constellation) of actors and patterns of their interaction 
 Solutions to a particular political problem can be reached by interdepend-
ent decisions of several actors with specific capabilities and action orienta-
tion regarding an expected result. Since decisions are interdependent, they 
are not reached by a single actor. The decisive factors are the constellation of 
actors and the pattern of their interaction (see Figure 1). 
 A constellation describes players who participate in a game, their strate-
gic options and the related results, as well as the players’ preferences re-
garding the expected results. 
 The constellation of actors concept has two important analytical func-
tions: 
1. By means of game theory, extremely different actual relations can be de-
scribed and mutually compared at a high level of abstraction and with a 
high degree of accuracy. 
2. By means of game theory, the level and types of conflicts between actors 
can be compared. This makes it possible to formulate hypotheses and 
thus evaluate the conflict-solving capacity in the context of various po-
litical problems. 
 A social constellation connected to some problem is, in and of itself, not 
a game which is played in a political process, but it can be projected onto a 
relation between the principal actors connected to the material-political ob-
jective (Scharpf, 2000: 80).  
 Consequently, in addition to the actors themselves, institutional design 
with its rules and values can also have an impact on efficient problem-solv-
ing. The type of constitutional solution (parliamentary or presidential sys-
tem), of the decision-making process (majority or consensual), the largeness 
of parliamentary majority etc. are not irrelevant factors. In those diverse 
contexts, actors can choose between various possibilities and patterns of in-
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2.2. The basics of game theory 
 Game theory9 seems to be appropriate for reduction of complex social 
problems to ideal type characteristics of a relation between two actors with 
two options each. Basically, the theory of games relies on the relation be-
tween three factors in the game: player, strategy and pay off 10. The game 
takes place when options (strategies) are interdependent, i.e. when the 
achieved result is conditioned by both (or more) players. 
 At the heart of game theory is the fact that the individual and collective 
pay offs of a player can be derived mathematically, in accordance with their 
interests and actions. Initial preferences of players, their choices, and indi-
vidual and collective optimum behaviour are taken in consideration.  
 The most common form of mathematical presentation is the matrix 
form11 of pay offs, in which the strategies of one player are shown in matrix 
lines, and those of the other are laid out in the columns. 
 There are four possible results of interaction, which show that the collec-
tively rational result can be “missed” if both players follow their own ra-
tional choice (Wagner, 2005: 255). 
 In international relations, the theory of games is applied for analysis of 
conflict situations with the aim of making the best possible political deci-
sions wherewith the opposing side can be successfully countered (Vukadi-
nović, 1998: 309). 
 There are two types of games: cooperative and non-cooperative. In a co-
operative game (a non-zero sum game)12 the players can reach binding 
agreements before each of them reaches a decision. In a non-cooperative 
game (a zero-sum game) nothing agreed before the game is binding, but both 
players are well informed about the other players and about their possible 
strategies. In the moment of their decision, the only thing they do not know 
is what strategy the opposing side will take. In the cooperative game, the 
 
9 The theory was founded in the USA in 1944 by the mathematician John Neumann and the 
economist Oskar von Morgenstern. It is a purposeful normative theory of rational-strategic ac-
tivity. 
10 A player is each individual or complex actor capable of choosing the goal-oriented mode 
of activity among the various possible modes. 
Strategies are activity options (or parts of options) available to a player. 
Profitability refers to the possibility to evaluate all possible results on the basis of the players’ 
preferences (Scharpf, 2000: 27). 
11 The game can also be presented in an extensive or a characteristic form. The choice of 
form depends on the type of game and its static or dynamic nature. 
12 In the zero-sum game, the sum of both players’ pay off is zero. One player’s profit equals 
the other player’s loss. In the non-zero-sum game, both players make some profit. 
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players can communicate and reach an agreement prior to the game regard-
ing the chosen strategies. In the non-cooperative game, such an agreement is 
impossible. 
 Another important distinction is the one between simultaneous and se-
quential non-cooperative games. In a simultaneous game, each player 
chooses his move without knowledge of the other player’s move, while in a 
sequential game the players make their moves in succession, and the latter 
player is aware of the former player’s move. These types of games can (but 
do not necessarily) influence the final result of non-cooperative game.  
 The theory of games comprises two more analytical concepts: strategic 
interaction and equilibrium result. The first concept has to do with each 
player’s knowledge of the strategy of the other. In a non-cooperative game, 
this can lead to indefinite postponement of a strategic decision. However, 
such an outcome is not possible in games with a single or multiple equilib-
rium solutions.13 An equilibrium solution (Nash equilibrium, for example) is 
a situation in which none of the players can achieve a better result for them-
selves through one-sided alteration of his strategy. 
 Empirically pure cases of cooperative and non-cooperative games are 
rare. Usually, there is a change of relation within the collective actors them-
selves, or a change of options and pay offs between players. Such games are 
termed mixed games14, in which players have both options – cooperative and 
a non-cooperative. Strategically, mixed games are very interesting, because 
they are non-zero-sum games, and the players’ interests are partly identical 
and partly opposed. 
 We will model the Croatian strategy of EU integration as a Battle of the 
Sexes game. It is important to point out that in this case we are dealing with 
three contextual levels: the international system (Croatia-EU), internal pol-
icy (coalition governments) and decision-makers (the governments of I. Ra-
čan and I. Sanader – European Commission). 





13 According to the Nash theorem, each game with a limited set of strategies has at least one 
equilibrium solution in the pure or modelled strategies. Since simple games can also have sev-
eral equilibrium solutions, the Nash equilibrium cannot anticipate a quite specific solution to the 
game. 
14 There are four most familiar types of games: Battle of the Sexes, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Assurance and Chicken. 
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Figure 2. “Battle of the Sexes” 


















 The constellation of the Battle of the Sexes is as follows: two actors (a 
man and a woman) want to spend an evening together. He wants to go to a 
boxing match, and she wants to go to the opera. This relation results with a 
conflict that needs to be solved. The basic characteristic of the Battle of the 
Sexes game is the fact that the dominant preference of both actors is to “stay 
together”, to realise their common aim. The second interest or preference is 
related to the option of dissimilar activity (“different ways to reach the 
goal”). According to the matrix (Figure 2), one can distinguish four possible 
solutions of cooperation and non-cooperation, with a corresponding individ-
ual pay offs for each player. The four pay offs for each actor are denoted 
numerically, 4 being the highest and 1 the lowest pay off. 
 The outcomes with highest payoffs (4, 3) and (3, 4), are the outcomes in 
which one actor does cooperate and the other does not. In this way, the 
dominant common preference (that the players stay together) is realised 
(Nash equilibrium). 
 The second best solution for both players is one in which neither cooper-
ates (2, 2). The situation in which they both cooperate (1, 1) has the lowest 
payoff for both actors, because in that case neither the first nor the second 
preference is realised (“they are not together, because she goes to the boxing 
match and he goes to the opera”). 
 
2.3. Analytical-methodological context of research  
 The previously described research perspectives must be shaped in such a 
way as to elaborate and demonstrate a concrete analytical context, which 
would lead to an effective application of the chosen methods and to discov-
ering relevant answers to two research problems put forward in the intro-
duction:  
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1. To identify and describe the strategic activity of the principal internal and 
external actors (Croatian governments and the European Union) in the 
process of EU integration; 
2. To evaluate and explain the obtained result of the principal actors’ inter-
action (management of Croatia and the EU15) in the process, and their 
individual contributions in the observed eight-year period. 
 In our description of the actors’ constellation and strategies, we make us 
of the theory of games, which is very convenient for a reduction of complex 
social and political phenomena to ideal typal models with two actors and two 
activity options (Bieling/Lerch, 2005: 254). 
 If constellations of actors are connected with some form of interaction, 
one obtains analytical indications of a conceptual scheme, which “presents 
itself” as a possibility of analytical problem-solving in different systems of 
interaction. Such a systematic research provides us with an extremely suc-
cessful tool for explaining the result of a particular political action. What is 
more, there is a possibility of obtaining practical and useful guidelines as to 
how different types of political problems can be solved by means of different 
institutional structures. 
 In our research, the above is illustrated by our choice of methodological 
procedure: 
1. Firstly, we empirically identify the collective actors and describe the im-
plementation result (positive and negative) of the Croatian integration 
strategy and the integration strategy of the EU with regard to Croatia in 
the 2000-2007 period, and project the problem to the actors’ relation and 
patterns of activity. 
2. Secondly, we define the strategic activity and profitability, wherewith 
both actors evaluate their choice of strategy and profitability considering 
the success of the integration process. 
3. Thirdly, we evaluate and explain the successfulness of strategic activity 
of the Croatian governments, as internal factors, and of the European 
Union, as the external factor. 
4. Finally, we discuss the correlation between institutional conditions and 
the actors’ behaviour. 
 
15 A group of German authors (Merkel, Puhle, Sandschneider etc.) brought together in 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and cooperating on the “System Development and Transformation” pro-
ject explored the dimensions of contribution of external and internal actors to the transformation 
and integration process. They defined and operationalised the “management or process-manag-
ing” dimension as an analytical level divided into two coherent subgroups of factors: “internal 
management” and “management of external support” (Weidenfeld, 2001: 59).  
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 The entire procedure is realised in a clearly defined analytical framework 
of identification and description of empirical facts.  
 In this paper we analyse the work and conduct of two Croatian govern-
ments: the multi-party coalition government of Ivica Račan (2000-2003) and 
the quasi-single-party government of Ivo Sanader (2003-2007). 
 The European Union concept implies the totality of strategies (of the 
European Commission, and of member states and other agencies) connected 
to Croatian integration process, ultimately articulated by the decisions of the 
European Council. 
 This also defines the relation within collective actors, which is important 
for the capability of strategic activity, in which “Račan’s government” repre-
sents a form of wide coalition, while “Sanader’s government” represents a 
form of narrow coalition with elements of a one-party system (even with 
corporate leadership), while the EU is a form of alliance, with the European 
Commission as an executive body and the European Council as a manage-
ment body. 
 The relation and interaction of those actors are projected onto the “Battle 
of the Sexes” model game, because the said model corresponds to the actors’ 
essential relation and preference. There is a reciprocal preference for Croa-
tia’s accession to the EU, but there are also separate preferences that have to 
do with the conditions and speed of accession. 
 In defining the basic Croatian strategic preference, we choose as our 
starting point the programmes of both Croatian governments, i.e. from the 
prioritized policy of Croatia’s entry into the EU. 
 The second preference is prompt entry with as few “accession costs” as 
possible. This refers to the choice of strategies that ensure political stability, 
economic growth, social peace and the probability of re-election of one’s 
own ruling policy.  
 In principle, the EU integration strategy towards Croatia has been con-
sistent (at least since 2000). The dominant preference is expressed in the 
commitment to Croatia’s entry into the EU, while the second preference has 
to do with meeting high and broadly determined conditions and criteria (re-
gional cooperation, return of refugees, judicial reforms, fight against corrup-
tion, minority rights, solving of problems with neighbours, meeting of re-
quests connected with The Hague Tribunal indictments etc.), and comprises 
no definite entry date.  
 In such a relation of strategies, actors can (but do not have to) take mat-
ters into their own hands in order to maximize their own profitability. But 
such behaviour is not socially effective, because the other rational actor is 
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bound to simultaneously pursue his own interest, and this would result in a 
stalemate. 
 Since status quo is unsuitable for both sides, it is necessary to act strate-
gically in such a way as to anticipate the reactions of the other actor. Antici-
pation then leads to the establishment of a stable balance result between actors. 
 The institutional context should also be included in the analysis, as part 
of observation focusing on the method and promptness of decision-making, 
on party relations in the government, on party relations in the Parliament, on 
relations between State President and Prime Minister etc.  
 The complex influence of political environment will be taken in consid-
eration with regard to (lack of) support of public opinion and financial help 
programs.  
 As far as the other actor (EU) is concerned, we will also take into ac-
count the attitude and influence of individual member states, the influence of 
individual agencies (The Hague Tribunal) and of other simultaneous and 
relevant integration processes, the provided assistance, the influence of pub-
lic opinion, the candidacy of Turkey etc. The design of analysis outlined 
above will enable us to gradually approach the final analysis of the research 
case.  
 
3. Croatia and the European Union 2000-2007 
3.1. The integration process in Croatia 
 Račan’s coalition government was inaugurated in late January 2000, af-
ter the parliamentary elections. It was formed out of six parties (SDP, HSLS, 
HSS, IDS, LS)16. Portfolios were allocated in accordance with the election 
result, and relying on their support in the Parliament. 
 The key strategic political decisions were reached by consensus at the 
Government-Party Coordination17 sessions. Limited possibilities of immedi-
ate communication and informing often resulted in postponement of gov-
ernment sessions and delayed decision-making. 
 
16 HSS (Hrvatska seljačka stranka – Croatian Peasant Party), HNS (Hrvatska narodna 
stranka – Croatian People’s Party), IDS (Istarski demokratski sabor, regionalna stranka – Istrian 
Democratic Assembly, regional party), LS (Liberalna stranka – Liberal Party). 
17 Government-Party Coordination was an institute derived from an inter-party agreement 
regarding the establishment of parliamentary majority and government. It consisted of six party 
leaders. The Prime Minister suggested the agenda and chaired the sessions, while the final deci-
sions were reached by consensus. The Coordination convened to discuss all important issues 
and just before the governmental or parliamentary sessions. 
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 During the mandate, two parties left the government: IDS left in 2001 
(but remained as parliamentary support), and next year it was followed by 
HSLS, which split into two factions – one faction (LIBRA) remained sup-
portive of the government, while the other (and larger) faction joined the op-
position. 
 This “reshuffling of political cards” additionally increased the impact of 
the opposition in the Parliament. The opposition’s standing up to the gov-
ernment was most manifest in its criticism of the latter’s “indulgence to-
wards Europe”, as well as in procedural obstruction of the adoption of re-
form laws in the Parliament. 
 Resistance to the government’s integration policy also came from diverse 
extra-parliamentary formal and informal groups. 
 In the 2000-2003 period, the support of public opinion regarding Croa-
tia’s entry into the EU declined from 77% to 73%, while the number of those 
opposed to the entry redoubled (more specifically, it increased from 10% to 
20%) (Sošić, 2005: 183). 
 In such circumstances, Račan’s government was only partly successful in 
meeting the requests and pressures coming from the EU. 
 In early 2000, after the death of Dr Franjo Tuđman, a new President – 
Stjepan Mesić was elected. He was not a coalition candidate, but he be-
longed to the same “political family”. Relations with the government were 
not always coordinated and cooperative, inter alia regarding some political 
issues that had to do with Croatia-EU relations. In 2001, Račan’s coalition 
government implemented a constitutional redraft, transforming the former 
semi-presidental system into a parliamentary system of government.  
 At the meeting of EU member states’ presidents and prime ministers held 
in November 2000 in Zagreb, Croatia was given a stimulus to begin prepa-
rations for EU membership. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) and the Interim Agreement were reached and signed in October 2001, 
and subsequently confirmed by the Croatian and European Parliaments. The 
latter agreement came into force on March 1, 2002. In early 2002, all EU 
member states (15 of them) initiated the ratification of SAA in their parlia-
ments. That process was not completed until the end of 2004. At the Copen-
hagen meeting in December 2002, the European Council confirmed the 
“European perspective” of the states included in the Process of Stabilisation 
and Association. Immediately after that, the Croatian Parliament accepted 
the Resolution on Croatia’s accession to the EU. In February 2003, Croatia 
submitted a formal request for full EU membership. In July 2003, the Euro-
pean Commission responded with a Questionnaire for the purpose of creat-
ing an Opinion regarding Croatia’s request, and already in October of the 
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same year the government provided the Commission with a comprehensive 
reply. 
 Parliamentary elections were held in November 2003, and a shift of 
power took place in Croatia. The EU and its members exerted strong pres-
sure on the Croatian government (The Hague Tribunal’s indictment of sev-
eral Croatian generals), especially in the final part of the mandate. This re-
sulted, on the one hand, in deceleration of the convergence process (ratifica-
tion of SAA was delayed); on the other hand, it lead to instability of gov-
ernment (HSLS left the coalition) and to social instability (protests of Croa-
tian homeland war veterans’ associations, strikes). Euro-scepticism among 
Croatian citizens grew and was even redoubled. According to research of 
public opinion, the percentage of Euro-sceptics increased from approxi-
mately 8,3% in 2000 to 16,3% at the end of 2003 (Sošić, 2005: 183). 
 At the end of 2003, a new centre-right government was inaugurated, 
namely the government of Dr Ivo Sanader. It was supported by several par-
ties in the parliament (HDZ, DC, HSLS, HSU)18, as well as by some minor-
ity representatives and independent parliament members. With the exception 
of one woman minister (DC), his was a single-party (HDZ) government. As 
such, it was able to reach fast political decisions that were adopted in the 
Parliament efficiently and without stalling. It opted for an active strategy of 
Croatia’s convergence towards the EU. To that purpose, an agreement was 
reached with all parliamentary parties to form an “Alliance for Europe” and 
to support the government’s pro-European policy.  
 In April 2004, the European Commission expressed a positive opinion 
regarding Croatia’s candidacy. On June 18th, at the session held in Brussels, 
the European Council gave Croatia the status of candidate for full EU mem-
bership. Croatia was requested to keep fulfilling the following conditions: 
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, return and accommodation of Serbian 
refugees, protection of minorities, the rule of law and democratization. Early 
in 2005, the Croatian President was re-elected. The cooperation between the 
government and the President was good. Although it was a sort of cohabita-
tion, it never caused a political crisis. 
 Throughout 2004 and in early 2005, Croatia did not manage to get a 
close and exact date from the European Council for the beginning of nego-
tiations. The process came to a halt. The EU emphasized the lack of “full 
cooperation” with The Hague Tribunal in tracking down and handing over 
General Ante Gotovina to The Hague.  
 In the Union itself, the member states (25) were divided in their evalua-
tions of “full cooperation”. As a consequence of EU insistence and forceful-
 
18 DC (Democratic Centre), HSU (Croatian Party of Pensioners) 
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ness on that point, the support of Croatian public decreased to less than 
50%19 – the lowest percentage ever. 
 Early in 2005, secretly and without the influence of the body politic, the 
Croatian government put together the Action Plan for full cooperation with 
the EU and The Hague Tribunal. The Action Plan was coordinated and ar-
ranged with the EU and its agencies, and it involved a number of common 
operative measures for tracking down General Gotovina and sending several 
generals from the Croatian War of Independence to The Hague. 
 At the meeting of the European Council held on October 3, 2005, the ne-
gotiation process with Croatia was finally set in motion, although it was still 
conditioned by further full cooperation with The Hague Prosecutor’s Office 
and the Tribunal and with the meeting of some other criteria. 
 General Gotovina was caught early in 2006. Three other accused gener-
als were handed over to the Tribunal. In this way, the Croatian government 
completely fulfilled the criteria of full cooperation. 
 The negotiation process on 35 chapters of the acquis was launched in 
2006 and lasts to this day. New chapters are opened successively, starting 
with the least demanding ones. In 2007 the process was slowed down, pri-
marily due to the European Commission’s discontent with the overall situa-
tion and insufficient reforms in judicature, and with a high level of corrup-
tion in the Croatian society.  
 At the very end of the government’s mandate, the EU exerted very large 
pressure on Croatia (especially the neighbouring countries of Slovenia and 
Italy) regarding the planned implementation (scheduled for January 1, 2008) 
of regulation related to the Protected Ecological and Fishery Zone (ZERP) in 
the Adriatic. Requests were voiced for the said regulation not to apply to EU 
member states. Croatia was reluctant to acquiesce, and the EU responded by 
slowing down the negotiation process. 
 In the parliamentary elections held on November 25, 2007, HDZ (Croa-
tian Democratic Union) won the same number of parliament mandates, thus 
remaining the most powerful political party in Croatia. The party’s head Dr 
Ivo Sanader received a new four-year mandate and formed a somewhat more 
inclusive coalition government. In addition to coalition partners from the 




19 Since 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration conducts public 
opinion polls on a semi-annual basis regarding support (or lack of support) to Croatia’s entry 
into the EU. The results are regularly published on the Ministry’s web page (www.mvpei.hr). 
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3.2. EU attitude during the integration process  
 After the shift of power in Croatia in January 2000, the European Union 
accepted a proactive policy of the Croatian government with respect to fu-
ture EU membership. The above-mentioned facts testify to a certain progress 
of the process and to the EU’s significant material pre-accession support to 
Croatia20. 
 In the end phase of the “great enlargement” to the East, the strategy of 
the EU regarding active enlargement towards Croatia (and South-East 
Europe) started to “lose momentum”, as it became increasingly focused on 
internal institutional reforms, especially on the work of the Convention in 
drawing up the Constitution Contract Reform for Europe. 
 Consequently, from 2002 on the “Croatian path” to Europe was condi-
tioned by additional, non-Copenhagen criteria (e.g. Hague indictments based 
on “command responsibility”, requests to hand over the Croatian generals 
and to speed up the return of Serbian refugees and the rebuilding. Moreover, 
the neighbouring candidate and member states (Slovenia, Italy) made addi-
tional political requests (borders, annulment of ZERP – Protected Ecological 
and Fishery Zone) which conditioned support to Croatia’s EU accession. An 
example of such individual pressure and conditioning is the process of SSA 
ratification, which stalled for more than two years.  
 Individual member states of the EU were clearly divided in their attitude 
towards Croatia. The countries which had previously supported the expan-
sion advocated the speeding up of the process, while others obstructed it.21 
 The EU commended and supported Sanader’s new government along its 
“path towards Europe”, which culminated when Croatia was given candidate 
status (June 18, 2004). Immediately after that, however, the EU opted for a 
“hard line”, requested fulfilment of various demands and criteria, and post-
poned its decision regarding the beginning of negotiations (for a period of 15 
months). At first, the EU put pressure on Croatia to “hand over Gotovina to 
The Hague”. Still, negotiations were set to begin on October 3, 2005, and 
Croatia was given favourable judgment regarding the “continuation of full 
cooperation”. 
 It should be pointed out that Turkey acquired the status of participant in 
the negotiations at the same session of the European Council, and that the 
 
20 Since 2001, Croatia has been a direct beneficiary of the European Union’s CARDS pro-
gram, which is intended for states who sign the SSA, and which amounted to 257 million € for 
the period from 2001 to 2004. 
21 The chief advocators of EU enlargement strategy are Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Austria and Germany. The principal opponents are France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 546). 
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“positive” solution for Croatia was not the result of objective evaluation that 
Croatia met the relevant criteria, but of the lobbying of Austria and several 
other member states, and of an encompassing and compromise-based nego-
tiation-beginning “package” for both Croatia and Turkey. 
 The described attitude of actors and the result of their interaction can be 
presented most adequately in a table, thus providing a fine basis for further 
analysis (Table 1) 
 
Table 1. Evaluation of (un)successfulness of the integration strategy of 
Croatia and the EU  
CROATIA 
Actors 
Positive achievements of 
the integration process 
Result of internal 
support (+ or -) 
EUROPEAN UNION 







– Zagreb Summit; begin-
ning of negotiations re-
garding the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement 
(SAA). 
 
– EU Council adopts the 





– SAA and Interim Agree-
ment are signed 
 
– Croatian Parliament and 




– European Council con-
firms the European per-
spective of SAA countries 
 





– Croatia makes a request 
for EU membership 
 
Initiation and stimula-
tion of the integration 
process (+) 
 




tion to politics of re-
gional cooperation 




with The Hague and 
other issues related to 













Hague indictment of 
Croatian generals (-) 
 
Parliamentary elec-
tions with a realistic 
possibility of a shift of 
power (-) 
 
Initial support to govern-
ments in their Pro-Euro-
pean integration Policy (+) 
 
Slow notification of SAA 
(2002–2004) (-) 
 
Demands for Croatia’s full 
cooperation with The 
Hague Tribunal (-) 
 
 
Assigning the role of veto-
actor to The Hague Prose-






Insistence on the return of 
Serbian refugees and ur-
gent rebuilding (-) 
 





Insistence on regional co-
operation (-) 
 
Giving up of conditioning 
of Croatia’s accession 
through bilateral relations 
with Croatia (-) 
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CROATIA 
Actors 
Positive achievements of 
the integration process 
Result of internal 
support (+ or -) 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Result of support (+ or -) 
Govern-
ment of Ivo 
Sanader 
2004. 
– Croatia receives a posi-
tive evaluation from the 
European Commission 
 
– European Council gives 






– European Council de-
clares the beginning of ne-
gotiations with Croatia re-
garding full EU member-
ship 
 
– The screening begins 
 
2006./2007. 
– The beginning and con-
tinuation of the acquis 
chapter 
 
– Electoral victory and the 
new mandate 
 




Forming of the “Coun-















Handing over of Go-
tovina (+) 
Reform halt (-) 
The beginning of the 




Request for a full, but im-
precise cooperation with 
the Hague Tribunal (-) 
 
Division among member 
states (25) regarding the 





Correlation of the Croatian 
issue with Turkey (+/-) 
 
Appreciation of the Action 
plan as a form of full coop-




Insistence on judicature re-
form, anticorruption (-) 
Negative context of 
neighboring states’ interest 
(Slovenia, Italy) regarding 
borders and ZERP (-) 
 
 
3.3. Results of Strategic Activity and Evaluation of Profitability 
 As pointed out in the methodological procedure, the second analytical 
step is connected to a projection of relations between internal and external 
actors on the “Battle of the Sexes” game (Figure 3). 
 On the basis of the illustrated model and previously defined preferences, 
we can establish the results of activity and profitability for each of the four 
combinations of chosen strategies: 
1.  The (C,C) result means that Croatia and the EU cooperate in such a way 
that Croatia accepts the second preference of the EU (meeting of all high 
criteria), and the EU accepts Croatia’s second preference (prompt entry).  
2. The (N,N) result means that Croatia and the EU do not cooperate, and 
that both stick to their preferences. 
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3. The (N,C) result means that Croatia does not cooperate with the EU, but 
the EU does cooperate with Croatia. In such a situation the EU would ac-
cept Croatia’s preferences. 
4. The (C,N) result means that Croatia cooperates with the EU, but the EU 
does not cooperate with Croatia. In such a situation Croatia would accept 
both preferences of the EU. 
 
Figure 3. Matrix of Croatia-EU relations 

















 Now we need to answer the following question: what is the profitability 
of a particular actor in each combination of chosen strategies, and how does 
their choice affect the course and successful outcome of the integration 
process? 
 The (C,C) combination, i.e. the reciprocal cooperation game (each player 
accepts preferences of the other), is least profitable to both actors. In this 
case, the game does not even ensure the realisation of basic preferences, i.e. 
continued involvement in the integration process, because it is contradictory 
in its essence (Prittwitz, 1994: 149). 
 The second worst option, for both actors and for the process as a whole, 
is to end up in the reciprocal non-cooperative game (N, N). This means that 
each actor sticks to his preferences, the problem is not solved, and status quo 
persists. But the integration process is still “included in the agenda”, and it is 
made operational only if one of the actors changes his strategy.  
 The (N, C) result is the most profitable for Croatia, because it would 
mean that the EU accepts Croatia’s preference (prompt entry). The (C, N) 
result is the most profitable for the EU, for it would mean Croatia’s accep-
tance of EU preferences (meeting of high and “inconvenient” conditions). 
 Both (C, N) and (N, C) results represent the Nash equilibrium solution, in 
which the preferences of actors in the non-cooperative game are not equally 
directed. In order to find himself in such a balance position, one of the play-
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ers must first decide to give up the (N, N) position and accept the coop-
erative game. Actors are required to find a strategic solution. 
 In the example of the EU and Croatia, this occurs when the first player 
(with greater resources) plays the non-cooperative game and strives to 
achieve the result most profitable for himself. Accordingly, it is the other 
player’s vital interest to choose the same result through the cooperative (se-
quential) game. Namely, after the second player (Croatia) opts for that other 
solution (C, N), which is the most profitable for him in a long-lasting inter-
active relationship (“to sit at the table”), he might come up with an even 
better solution (for example, a deal to use alternately the solutions acceptable 
for each side). Such solutions would be a prerequisite for a more lasting, 
more reliable, and mutually beneficial cooperation. 
 The described development is important, for without it, the resulting 
growing dissatisfaction could incite the permanently injured party to a new 
interrelation, with a significantly altered essence of mutual cooperation. 
There is a number of other complex equilibrium solutions to the non-coop-
erative game (dominance, maximin, Bayesian, Nash equilibrium...) and the 
cooperative game (stable set, core, compromise solution...), but in our case, 
the adoption of Croatia to the (C,N) balance situation seems to be a rather 
plausible solution. 
 
4. Evaluation of successfulness of the Croatian governments 
and the European Union in the integration process (2000-
2007)  
 To perform successful strategic action means to rely upon credible infor-
mation and one’s own processing capacity and to react to risk or opportuni-
ties that can emerge in a certain relation between actors, in such a way that 
ultimate benefits are maximized (Scharpf, 2000: 107). Based on the analysis 
of the relationship between Croatia and the EU conducted thus far (Table 1), 
it is possible to illustrate (Table 2) the positive and negative elements of 
strategic activity. Then we can make an overall evaluation of the successful-
ness of internal management of Račan’s and Sanader’s governments and of 
the external support of the European Union to the conducting and the results 
of the integration process. 
 Based on the emphasized elements and evaluations presented in Table 2, 
we can put forward the final, lapidary analysis in this study from the stand-
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Divergence of preferences (-) 
 
 











Cooperation with the 
President of the (-/+) 
Republic of Croatia 
  
Coordination of parties 
and consensus 








Cooperation with the 
President of the (-/+) Re-
public of Croatia 
 
Wide and unified parlia-
mentary majority (+)  
Positive attitude towards de-
mocratic changes (+) 
 




Member states in favour of ex-
pansion (Austria, Germany, 
Finland, Denmark, UK, Swe-
den) (+) 
 
Member states opposed to ex-
pansion (Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 






Partial meeting of re-
quests (-/+) 
 
Slow meeting of crite-
ria (reforms) (-/+) 
  
Non-cooperation (-) 
Good meeting of re-
quests (+/-) 
 
Prompt meeting of crite-
ria (reforms) (+/-) 
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EU policy  
towards 
Croatia 
Pressure, stalling with 
positive decisions (-) 
 
 
High criteria and addi-






Pressure and prompting 
of positive decisions  
(-/+) 
 
Lowering of high criteria 
and requests (-/+) 
 
Non-cooperation (-/+) 
and then acceptance of 
cooperation 
 






Low support, high Eu-
roscepticism (+/-) 
Support under 50% (-/+) 
Higher support in the ne-
gotiation phase (+) 
Turkey’s request for accession 
(+) 
EU public opinion (+) 
Negative attitude of the 




4.1. The government of Ivica Račan (2000-2003) 
 This government gave impetus to the EU-integration process, which until 
then had been stagnant. Its greatest achievements were Croatia’s candidacy 
for EU membership and the submission of the Questionnaire to the European 
Commission in order to get the Opinion of the European Council. Its man-
date expired before the EU declared its positive opinion regarding Croatia’s 
candidacy, but its contribution to it was considerable. The strategic goal set 
in the beginning of the mandate was to acquire the candidate status and to 
enter negotiations, but Račan’s coalition government failed to realise this 
goal. 
 As shown in the empirical analysis, the reasons for this government’s 
failure to realise its own program and to meet the citizens’ expectations in 
the EU accession process can be summarized by the following three state-
ments: 
1. The government’s too wide (six-party) coalition structure. The strategic 
integration-oriented action of the coalition was obstructed by the differ-
ence in particular interests of the parties, in their socio-political identi-
ties, and in the lack of a single firm and regulated coalition agreement. 
Through its specific way of decision-making (party coordination), its 
slow mode of operation (consensus), and its particular interests and dis-
trust, this government achieved only a divergence of strategic prefer-
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ences, rather than a convergence which was absolutely essential to fruit-
ful interaction with EU bodies.  
2. The unaccomplished minimal “functional unity” with the oppositional 
parliamentary groups regarding the program of support to the govern-
ment’s integration strategy, and the above-mentioned strategic lack of 
coordination with the President of the Republic, also contributed to its 
lack of success. 
3. Finally, the government’s insistence on a strategy of incomplete coopera-
tion with the EU, i.e. of preserving status quo as the second and least 
profitable result (N, N) in the “Battle of the Sexes” model, and its ex-
pectancy of a certain change in EU strategy (to occur sooner or later) 
based on “comprehension of the circumstances, position and importance 
of Croatia”, were completely non-realistic, both analytically and in prac-
tice.  
 
4.2. The government of Ivo Sanader (2003-2007)  
 Upon evaluation of this government’s four-year mandate, one can con-
clude that it was more successful than the previous government and that it 
achieved more concrete positive results in the integration process. Its great-
est achievement was the acquisition of the candidate status and the initiation 
of the negotiation process. The success of strategic activity in interaction 
with the EU can be illustrated by the following points: 
1. A strong one-party government (up to 2006, just one minister from an-
other party) with a strong Prime Minister (simultaneously president of 
the strongest party in the Parliament). It sometimes acts as a corporative 
actor and uses it’s capability to set goals independent of preferences of 
the group it should serve (HDZ). This enables the leadership to be effi-
cient and successful, although elements of “autocratic danger” are in-
volved, associated with the mastering of political processes which does 
not have to be accounted for. 
2. Realization of the all-party “Alliance for Europe” and cooperation with 
the President of the Republic, whereby a wide parliamentary and politi-
cal support to the government’s convergent strategic preference of rela-
tions to the European Union was secured.  
3. Through its “Action plan”, the government has done an important turn 
towards a more complete cooperation with the EU. Viewed in the theory 
of games context, the government has thus achieved the Nash equilib-
rium, i.e. the second best strategic result (C,N) which Croatia could 
achieve in an interactive game with the European Union. 
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 4.3. The European Union 
 The attitude of the EU towards the policy and strategy of both govern-
ments was positive and promising (in particular in the beginning of their re-
spective mandates). Later on, in moments when important decisions were 
expected, relations became strained due to the imposition of new require-
ments, which either reached beyond the content of the Copenhagen criteria 
or else were imposed by particular member states. In principle, it can be said 
that neither of the governments received preferential treatment from the EU. 
On the basis of general analytical insight into the attitude of the EU (Table 
2), we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. Croatia’s integration process was negatively influenced by the fact that 
some member states hindered the expansion, others had special “political 
interests” (Italy), while still others were historically “prejudiced” towards 
Croatia (e.g. Great Britain).  
2. In addition to that, it was negatively influenced by a slow, inert and com-
plicated system of important decision-making in the EU, as well as by 
the fact that, before it was decided to begin negotiations, Croatia was 
considered as a single candidacy case.  
3. Croatia’s integration process was positively influenced by consistent sup-
port of the EU given to Croatia on its way towards accession, and by ob-
jective encouragement of its democratic consolidation.  
4. It was also positively influenced by material help through various pro-
grams (CARDS, INTERREG), and by stimulation of social reform. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In respect of the final analysis and the proposed answers, we believe that 
this paper has fulfilled the objective of research. Our research methods actor-
centred institutionalism and game theory, have proven to be useful tools for 
the analysis. The model game (Battle of the Sexes) with two collective ac-
tors, which are very complex, enabled us to come much closer methodologi-
cally to a projection of objective reality than it would have been possible by 
the use of other partial theories. Objectively speaking, it is clear that to nar-
row down observation to coalition governments as collective players in this 
theoretical game entails an analytical limitation. In our case, however, the 
limitation has been largely reduced, if not altogether removed, by the fact 
that, formally, none other than the governments of countries acceding to the 
EU and the European Commission are the principal (one could almost say, 
the only) decision-making actors in the process. Parliamentary decisions (or, 
in the case of Croatia, a referendum) on the accession contract can be 
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reached only after the negotiations are successfully completed and the acces-
sion contract signed. 
 The mentioned remarks and restrictions notwithstanding, the analysis 
proved to be a fine contribution to the scientific inquiry into certain more or 
less complex political processes or developments, which are otherwise rela-
tively frequently and readily dispatched to the field of trivial analysis and 
estimations, and of “very inventive”, but more often than not erroneous 
prognoses.  
 We have deliberately omitted an interesting methodological and theoreti-
cal possibility, namely to make use of obtained evaluations of the actors’ 
interaction in order to formulate some institutional solutions that would lead 
to optimization of their results, for it would exceed the scope of this paper. 
We have also refrained from discussing in great detail the actors’ institu-
tional relation with the political environment on various levels (USA, glob-
alisation), for the very same reason.  
 Having compared the strategic attitude of the EU towards each govern-
ment, we have found it to have been neutral, with an equal share of positive 
and negative elements in its support to the internal management of the proc-
ess. The same could be said with regard to the political environment, which 
has treated both governments with equal (lack of) favouritism, and to the un-
changed institutional context. The three mentioned factors can therefore be 
considered constant in regard of internal management of the integration 
process. Empirically evidenced differences in the success of Croatia’s Euro-
integration process are caused by inner management, i.e. by differences in 
the capability for strategic activity. Sanader’s one-party centre-right gov-
ernment was more successful than Račan’s wide-coalition centre-left gov-
ernment.  
 The parliamentary elections held in November 2007, in which the Croa-
tian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the government of Ivo Sanader won an-
other four-year mandate, confirmed our analytical evaluation of their suc-
cessfulness. 
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